Abstract. Whistleblowing is a powerful tool that the tax authorities of various countries use to curb tax evasion. Nonetheless, the determinants shaping one's positive attitude toward whistleblowing on tax evaders are rather understudied. We investigate the relationship between trust in the government and the attitude toward whistleblowing on tax evaders. We use data from two survey experiments conducted in Italy and the US, as well as from a unique national household survey administered in the Republic of Armenia. Our findings indicate that the level of trust in the government positively influences individuals' attitude toward whistleblowing, with this effect being robust across countries and data sources.
Introduction
"Report someone to HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) if they're in trade or running a business but aren't paying tax on their profits." 4 "Whistleblowers have helped the IRS detect and deter tax noncompliance and avoidance, helping to protect both the nation's revenue collection and the integrity of our voluntary compliance tax system. Indeed, since 2007, information submitted by whistleblowers has assisted the IRS in collecting $3.4 billion in revenue." 5 These statements depict whistleblowing as a crucial channel through which the tax authorities of various countries (in the abovementioned paragraph the tax authorities of the UK and the USA, respectively) intend to curb tax evasion. Indeed, detecting instances of tax fraud by obtaining information from witnesses or accomplices can be (sometimes) more efficient than extracting information through costly audits. Despite its paramount importance for policymakers, the determinants that shape citizens' attitude toward whistleblowing on tax evaders are rather understudied in the literature. More specifically, to the best of our knowledge, no one has investigated the relationship between the attitude toward whistleblowing and the trust in formal institutions, such as the government and the tax authorities. As far as we are concerned, the personal and contextual correlates of whistleblowing in the context of tax evasion are not extensively studied either. The current paper aims at contributing to these relevant research questions.
We believe that the aim of the present paper is of utmost importance, since the taxation literature puts forth trust in the authorities as an important determinant of individual tax compliance. More specifically, it is illustrated that high trust can increase taxpayers' intrinsic 4 https://www.gov.uk/report-an-unregistered-trader-or-business (retrieved on November 2, 2018). 5 2016 Annual Report to the Congress of the Internal Revenue Service (https://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/fy16_wo_annual_report_final.pdf, retrieved on November 2, 2018).
3 motivation to pay taxes (e.g., Feld & Frey, 2002; Torgler, 2003) and curb tax evasion (e.g., Kirchler, Hoelzl & Wahl, 2008; Muehlbacher, Kirchler & Schwarzenberger, 2011) . Considering this evidence, one may conjecture that high trust can positively affect taxpayers' attitude toward whistleblowing as well as increase the frequency of actual reports. Thus, if the authorities of a country strive to establish institutional mechanisms to encourage whistleblowing, they should first invest effort in enhancing citizens' trust in public institutions. Otherwise, if the issue of trust is neglected, even the best legal regimes (e.g., whistleblower protection acts) or incentivizing mechanisms (e.g., financial rewards) may fail to encourage individuals to report fraudulent behavior in the presence of low trust in institutions.
To investigate the causal relationship between the trust in the government and the attitude toward whistleblowing, we administer two survey-experiments in Italy and the US. More specifically, we elicit respondents' attitude toward whistleblowing and study how this is affected by trust in the government. We manipulate trust by presenting vignettes that describe the situation of a hypothetical agent living in either a high-trust or a low-trust environment. Our choice to focus on the American and the Italian contexts is motivated by real-world considerations. The US is characterized by a long-established whistleblowing culture and low public-sector corruption (ranking 16/180 on an increasing scale of perceived corruption according to the Corruption Perception Index 2017 of the Transparency International). Relative to the USA, Italy is characterized by higher rates of tax evasion (e.g., Schneider, 2005; Schneider & Enste, 2013) , a more corrupt public sector (ranking 54/180 according to the Corruption Perception Index 2017) and a recently emerging whistleblowing culture. These differences between the American and the Italian contexts allow us to check the robustness of our conclusions in relation to sources of institutional and social heterogeneity. 4 We believe that survey-experiments represent an ideal methodological framework for our research question, especially for the possibility of establishing clear causal relationship as well as for the possibility of properly framing the decision task in the taxation context and manipulating the trust in the government. Nevertheless, our methodological choice is not exempted from potential issues. Most importantly, the external validity of the results can be questioned by both the representativeness of the experimental population and the ad-hoc vignette description used to manipulate trust. In an attempt to address these issues, we extend our analysis by using a unique nationwide survey data collected by the Caucasus Research and Resource Centers (CRRC) in the framework of the "Armenia Tax Reform Project." Taxation is the main topic of the survey and the standardized questionnaire includes a broad set of questions about taxes, respondents' tax morale, the tax administration, and the level of trust in state institutions (including the Government). To the best of our knowledge, no other survey simultaneously elicits respondents' trust in public institutions and the attitude toward whistleblowing on tax evaders. The Republic of Armenia is a landlocked post-soviet republic in the South Caucasus. The country is characterized by high corruption levels (ranking 107/180 according to the Corruption Perception Index 2017) and lowquality institutions, which are among the main obstacles hindering tax collection (Davoodi & Grigorian, 2007) . Given the institutional incapacity to detect all acts of wrongdoing, third-party reporting of malfeasance can serve as a powerful and cost-effective channel for policy makers to improve the tax collection rates. Taking this into account, in recent years, the Government is actively trying to create a favorable institutional environment for whistleblowers in the country. Nonetheless, trust in state institutions is chronically low (e.g., Antinyan, Baghdasaryan & Grigoryan, 2018). 6 For instance, please see https://news.am/eng/news/389219.html (retrieved on October 4, 2018).
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Anticipating the results, we document a robust relationship between trust and the attitude toward whistleblowing. Individuals with high trust in the authorities are more likely to report acts of wrongdoing. This result is robust across countries (i.e., Armenia, Italy, USA) and study methodologies (i.e., survey experiment, survey). High tax morale is positively related to individuals' attitude toward reporting tax evaders in the survey-experiment, albeit non-significant in the survey. The perception of tax evasion is not related with the attitude toward whistleblowing neither in the survey nor in the survey-experiment. The same refers to such socio-demographic variables as age, marital status, education, employment status and income. Finally, females are more likely to express a positive attitude toward whistleblowing than males in the survey, whereas we do not detect substantial gender differences in the survey-experiment.
The paper contributes to the limited empirical literature that studies whistleblowing in the context of tax evasion (e.g., Breuer, 2013). The extant experimental and empirical work mainly focuses on whistleblowing behavior of employees in organizations, of cartel members, and of bribers on corrupt officials. This, in our view, is substantially different from the whistleblowing behavior of individuals in the context of taxation. The former type of whistleblowing mainly deals with conspiracies from within organization and refers to "traitorous whistleblowing" (e.g., Breuer, 2013). Furthermore, in this case, the probability of detection and retaliation is relatively high, since the set of concerned counterparts is rather narrow. In contrast, whistleblowing on tax evaders mainly depicts the situation of a citizen who reports peers' tax frauds without being directly involved in the business. Moreover, due to anonymity protection policies generally implemented by tax authorities, the probability of detection and retaliation in this setting is low. For instance, any potential customer can anonymously report to the tax authority that the seller (or the dentist, the mechanic, etc.) did not issue the tax receipt. These differences suggest that there are sound 6 reasons to believe that the institutional, contextual and personal determinants that shape whistleblowers' decisions and intentions may substantially vary across the organizational and the taxation settings.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review.
Section 3 sketches the empirical approach. Section 4 details the description of the survey experiment. Section 5 illustrates the survey data, the empirical specification and reports the results of the estimations. Section 6 concludes the paper and suggests policy recommendations.
Literature Review
The (experimental) literature dealing with whistleblowing has mainly focused on five research questions detailed below. To the best of our knowledge and with the only exception of Breuer (2013), existing studies have focused on whistleblowing in contexts that are outside the topic of the present paper, namely tax evasion.
Can whistleblowing curb dishonest activities? To this end, experiments have depicted whistleblowing as a powerful tool to prevent such activities as cartel formation (e.g., Apesteguia, Dufwenberg & Selten, 2007; Hinloopen & Onderstal, 2007) , bribery (Abbink, 2014) , software piracy (Oh & Teo, 2010) , tax evasion (Breuer, 2013) , managerial wrongdoing (e.g., Wallmeier, 2018) , organizational lying (Reuben, Reuben & Stein, mimeo) , cheating (Grimm et al, 2016 ) and the like.
How are the whistleblowers perceived in society and are they intrinsically motivated to report the deceptive behavior of others? Interestingly, many individuals are intrinsically motivated and report wrongdoing. However, the whistleblowers are not perceived well even by honest individuals, and this negative stigma effect can substantially shrink the instances of reporting (e.g., Reuben & Stephenson, 2013) .
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Which legal regime (belief-based or fact-based) protects the whistleblowers the best and encourages them to report acts of wrongdoing truthfully? In a belief-based jurisdiction (e.g., USA), the whistleblower is not required to provide proof of the allegations made: a "reasonable belief" is sufficient to be protected by law, even if the allegation turned out to be incorrect. In factbased jurisdictions (e.g., France or Germany), whistleblower protection is generally granted after the validation of the whistleblower's claim. According to experiments, in belief-based system, the reporting of wrongdoing can be higher, nonetheless the reports can contain a substantial number of fraudulent claims. The latter can diminish the prosecutors' incentives to investigate and can make the deterrence of wrongdoing more difficult (e.g., Mechtenberg, Roider & Muehlheusser, 2017) .
Should the whistleblowers be financially rewarded for reporting wrongdoers? Since, the instances of whistleblowing are not ubiquitous enough, incentivizing the whistleblowers is a hot topic. While in the US jurisdiction, the Dodd-Frank Act allows the whistleblowers to receive financial bounties for reporting the information to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the regulatory agencies in other countries (e.g., the UK) strongly oppose such a practice.
The research illustrates that monetary rewards lead to a significant increase in reporting fraudulent behavior (e.g., Breuer, 2013; Butler, Serra & Spagnolo, 2017; Schmolke & Utikal, 2016) .
What are the personal and the situational correlates inducing individuals to blow the whistle?
Indeed, understanding the personal and situational correlates may help policymakers to estimate who is more likely to blow the whistle and in which situations. This will contribute to the design of both private (e.g., Bartuli, Djawadi & Fahr, 2016) and public institutions as well as incentive schemes. Based on the whistleblowing literature in the organizational context, it is still unclear whether socio-demographic characteristics influence the decision to blow the whistle and what the 8 sign of such a relationship is. For instance, while some studies find that whistleblowers are more educated, male and older, others either claim that females are more likely to become whistleblowers or do not document gender effect at all (e.g., Near & Miceli, 1996; MesmerMagnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Cassematis & Wortley, 2013) . The same argument refers to other socio-demographic factors (e.g., Bartuli, Djawadi & Fahr, 2016) . Several researchers go beyond the socio-demographics and study the impact of personality traits (e.g., Bjorkelo, Einarsen & Matthiesen, 2010; Chiu, 2003; Bartuli, Djawadi & Fahr, 2016) .
Our contribution to the abovementioned literature is that we experimentally and empirically investigate the relationship between trust in the government and the attitude toward whistleblowing on tax evaders.
Why should trust in the government represent an important determinant of whistleblowing on tax evaders? The "slippery slope" framework by Kirchler, Hoelzl & Wahl (2008) puts forth two main determinants affecting taxpayers: trust and power. Taxpayers' high trust in authorities results in a cooperative environment in which taxpayers voluntarily declare their income. In contrast, taxpayers' distrust in the authorities results in an antagonistic climate in which the taxpayers and the state are in conflict with one other. In this case, the state can enforce tax compliance merely by exercising power. The empirical evidence illustrates that high trust in tax authorities is indeed associated with high levels of voluntary tax compliance and an increased sense of civic duty (Muehlbacher, Kirchler & Schwarzenberger, 2011; Kogler, Muehlbacher & Kirchler, 2015; Feld & Frey, 2002) . We believe that the uncovering of wrongdoers can be perceived as a cooperative outcome between individuals and the state, whereby citizens are ready to voluntarily expose tax evaders for the sake of increasing tax compliance. 
Behavioral Prediction and the Empirical Approach
In light of the extant literature, the main prediction we aim to test is whether trust in authorities stimulates citizens' attitude to cooperate with tax authorities by voluntary reporting tax frauds.
Thus, we expect that the positive attitude toward whistleblowing is much more pronounced in a high-trust than in a low-trust environment. It is also reasonable to expect that ceteris paribus, in a high-trust environment, the probability of actual whistleblowing will be substantially higher than in a low-trust environment.
To uncover the causal impact of trust on whistleblowing attitudes, we administer a surveyexperiment in Italy and the US and manipulate the perception of trust in a hypothetical government with ad hoc vignettes. Vignettes are short descriptions of a person or a social situation, which contains factors that might be relevant and salient for the respondent's decision (e.g., Alexander & Becker, 1978) . One of the main advantages of a vignette analysis is that it can narrow the gap between the study and the real world, mimicking real decision tasks and situations (Hainmueller, Hangartner & Yamamoto, 2015) . This is important for our setting, in which we need to manipulate the level of trust in institutions as realistically as possible. To do so, we depict loaded vignettes with either a well-functioning or a malfunctioning government. To this date, survey-experiments have been successfully used by economists to investigate such important research questions as the concerns for relative standing (Pingle & Mitchell, 2002; Johansson-Stenman, Carlsson & Daruvala, 2002) , the determinants of life satisfaction (Angelini, Bertoni & Corazzini, 2016) , the willingness to pay for insurance plans (Krueger & Kuziemko, 2013) , the perceptions and concerns for distributional fairness (Faravelli, 2007; Cruces, Perez-Truglia & Tetaz, 2013) , the effects of information about inequality and taxes on preferences for redistribution (Kuziemko et al., 2015) , as well as the effects of information about public spending on support for public spending (Lergetporer et al., 2016) .
Although survey-experiments are a powerful instrument to establish the causal link between trust and the attitude toward whistleblowing, they can raise important concerns of external validity.
For instance, the results may suffer from a hypothetical bias, i.e., the responses to the hypothetical scenarios may substantially differ from real behavior. In this regard, Hainmueller, Hangartner & Yamamoto (2015) illustrate the external validity of survey-experiments: the estimated causal effects obtained via hypothetical choices in a vignette study can hold in natural experiments. One may also argue that the results can be attributed to the specific wording of the vignettes. A third critique can be that, if the sample size is not large enough, the results may not hold with a different sample of respondents.
To resolve potential issues associated with survey-experiments, as a second step, we utilize a Few design issues regarding the vignettes are worth noting. First, the trust manipulation stems from the discussion of Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008) . More specifically, the government in the high-trust vignette is depicted as one that aims for transparent procedures and for respectful and supportive treatment of taxpayers. Furthermore, the government is described to perform a service for the community by not wasting taxpayers' money and providing all the necessary public goods.
Second, a hypothetical third person living in a hypothetical country is portrayed in the vignettes. Whistleblowing is a sensitive topic, and whistleblowers may be associated with sneaks, spies, rats and the like (e.g., Jubb, 1999) . Under these circumstances, a study participant may not report her true preferences when answering whistleblowing questions on her own behalf in order 12 not to harm her identity because of concerns about social approval. By using a third person, we intend to liberate the respondents from their own circumstances. We assume that the respondents will apply their own preferences when making choices on behalf of the third person. Projecting the vignettes onto a third person is an accepted approach in the experimental literature. Third, we alter the gender in the vignettes to avoid any possible interaction between the gender of the third person and the responses of the participants. In 50% of the cases, randomly selected, the hypothetical third person is a male, while in the remaining 50% of the cases the hypothetical third person is a female. A respondent faces either male or female vignettes. We use male and female names that are common in the countries where the experiment takes place.
8 Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the structure of the survey-experiment, while Table A1 in Appendix A details the vignettes utilized in the study. Fourth, our experiment allows both for between-subjects as well as within-subjects comparisons, which, we believe, adds to the generalizability and the robustness of our findings.
More specifically, by comparing the responses to the first and the second stage vignettes across HT-LT and LT-HT treatments, we can estimate the between-subjects effect of trust in the government on the attitude toward whistleblowing. In the same vein, by comparing the responses to the first and the second stage vignettes within HT-LT and LT-HT treatments, we can estimate the within-subjects effect of trust in the government on the attitude toward whistleblowing. 8 We used Marco and Sarah for Italy, while Robert and Anna for the USA. 
Procedures
The survey-experiment was administered via Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com) and took place in Italy in January 2018 and in the USA in August 2018.
The Italian subject pool was recruited through various Italian student groups on Facebook. The Qualtrics link of the survey-experiment was placed in the respective groups. Once a study participant entered into the study by clicking on the link, she was randomly and anonymously assigned to (only) one of the two treatments.
The American subject pool was recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT henceforth).
AMT has recently turned into a popular means of experimental data generation for social scientists.
AMT is a crowdsourcing marketplace which allows individuals (and businesses) to assign paid tasks to a large population of workers all over the world. The advantage of AMT is that it is a relatively cheap and fast device for data collection (Rand, 2012) 14 $1.38 (Horton & Chilton, 2010) . The researchers are able to replicate (even complex) experimental studies conducted in the physical laboratory (e.g., Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010) . Overall, 200 subjects were recruited, and each subject was paid 0.6$ for a 10-minute survey, which results in an hourly wage of 3.6$.
Results
In total, 278 subjects out of 350 in Italy (86% response rate) and 172 subjects out of 200 in the USA (79.429% response rate) completed the questionnaire. Table 1 shows some sociodemographic characteristics of the participants in both countries. Working A binary variable that is equal to 1 if the respondent is a hired worker, individual entrepreneur/employer or self-employed, and the value of 0 otherwise; Marital Status: Couple A binary variable that is equal to 1 if the respondent is married or cohabitating and 0 otherwise.
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The US sample is older than the Italian one, more educated with a larger fraction of non-single participants. These considerations are in line with general demographics of "turkers" in the US who are usually found to be educated and with a median age of 30 (Ross et al., 2010) .
Between-Subjects Analysis
We first analyze the respondents' attitude toward whistleblowing by comparing responses to the first and the second stage vignettes across treatments. Since the respondents' judgements may depend on the gender of the third person depicted in the vignettes, we check for a possible interaction between the gender of the vignette and the attitude toward whistleblowing. For each country and stage, we compare the responses to the high-trust (low-trust) vignette using a male third person with the responses to the high-trust (low-trust) vignette using a female third person.
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test illustrates that the gender in the vignettes does not exert any effect on respondents' judgments, both when considering the Italian and the American samples in the first stage. Interestingly, we document a gender effect for the American sample in the second stage.
The results are shown in Table 2 . Thus, for the first stage analysis we can pool the responses to the high-trust (low-trust) vignette using a male third person with the responses to the high-trust (low-trust) vignette using a female third person. For the second stage analysis, we only pool the data for the Italian sample and for the high-trust vignette of the American sample. We also check whether the sequence of the vignettes creates order effects. For instance, the responses to the high-trust vignette question may differ depending on whether the high-trust vignette appears in the first or the second stage (i.e., low-trust vignette appears in the first stage).
The same refers to the answers to the low-trust vignette question. The non-parametric MannWhitney U test documents no order effects. Only in the comparison of the vignettes with a female third person in the American and the Italian samples we detect marginally significant differences.
The results are depicted in Table 3 . Next, we focus on the impact of trust in the government on the attitude toward whistleblowing, utilizing the pooled dataset wherever applicable. As a reminder, the respondents had to state how much they agree or disagree with a third person's decision not to report the instances of tax evasion around him or her on a scale from 1 (Completely Agree) to 4 (Completely Disagree). Table 4 reports the mean level of agreement across different treatments. The standard deviation is reported in parentheses. The table suggests that, in both countries, respondents' disagreement is higher in the high-trust vignette than in the low-trust vignette. The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test detects significant treatment effect in Italy both in the first stage (Z=2.918, p=0.004) and in the second stage (Z=4.854, p=0.000) vignettes. Likewise, significant treatment effect is present in the first stage vignettes in the USA (Z=2.981, p-value=0.003). In the second stage, we document a significant treatment difference between Robert Low-Trust and the pooled High-Trust vignettes only.
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The formal regression analysis confirms the results of the non-parametric tests. As our dependent variable is measured on a scale from '1' to '4,' we treat it as an interval variable and Recall, that in the American sample we can pool the responses to the high-trust vignette with a male third person with the responses to the high-trust vignette with a female third person. However, we cannot pool the responses to the low-trust vignette with a male third person with the responses to the low-trust vignette with a female third person. Thus, we separately compare the responses to Robert Low-Trust and Anna Low-Trust vignettes with those of the pooled High-Trust vignette.
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estimate OLS and tobit models for each country.
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Throughout the text we comment on those variables that are robust across different models. Table 5 depicts the results of the estimations. We regress the respondents' agreement not to blow the whistle on tax evaders on a High-Trust dummy, which assumes the value of 1 if the vignette refers to the high-trust scenario and of 0 otherwise, as well as on a set of personal and contextual controls (tax morale, tax evasion perception and the variables reported in Table 1 ). Tax evasion perception is an integer that assesses respondents' perception of tax evasion in the country on a scale from 1 (almost no one evades taxes) to 10 (almost everyone evades taxes).
In the first stage, we utilize the pooled dataset for both countries. In the second stage, we use the pooled dataset for the Italian sample only. For the American sample, we distinguish between low-trust vignettes with male and female third persons. To do so, we introduce a dummy variable Anna Low Trust, which assumes the value of 1 in the low-trust vignette with a female third person and 0 otherwise. Thus, Robert Low Trust is the omitted category.
To check the robustness of our results, we preserve the ordinal nature of the scale and estimate ordered probit models. Conclusions remain qualitatively unchanged. Results are available upon request. Results from OLS (robust standard errors in parentheses) and Tobit (standard errors in parentheses) models. Dependent variable: Respondents attitude about not reporting the tax evaders measured on a scale from 1 (Completely Agree) to 4 (Completely Disagree). Independent Variables: High-Trust Dummy-Dummy variable which equals to 1 in high-trust vignettes and 0 otherwise; Male-Dummy variable which equals to 1 if the respondent is male and 0 otherwise; WorkingDummy variable which equals to 1 if the respondent is employed either full-time or part-time or self-employed and 0 otherwise; Age-An integer, indicating the age of the respondent; Education-An integer that indicates the highest level of the respondent's education and assumes the values of 1 (No education), 2 (School certificate); 3 (Bachelor's degree); 4 (Master's degree) and 5 (PhD); Tax Morale-An integer that elicits the tax morale of the respondent on a scale from 1 (Completely justified to evade taxes) to 10 (Completely unjustified to evade taxes); Tax Evasion Rate Perception-An integer that elicits respondent's perception of tax evasion on a scale from 1 (Almost no one evades taxes) to 10 (Almost everyone evades taxes).
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The positive and highly significant coefficient of the High-Trust Dummy suggests that the disagreement with not reporting the tax evaders is higher in the high-trust vignette than in the low-trust vignette. One can also evidence an interesting relationship between tax morale and the attitude toward whistleblowing. Ceteris paribus, the higher the respondent's tax morale the higher the disagreement with not reporting the tax evaders. As for the relationship between socio-demographic characteristics and the attitude toward whistleblowing, gender, education, the employment status, and age do not seem to play a key role. Tax evasion perception is not associated with the attitude toward whistleblowing either. We summarize the previous results in the following statement.
Result 1. Trust toward the government has a positive impact on individuals' attitude toward blowing the whistle on tax evaders.
Within-Subjects Analysis
In this section, we take advantage of the longitudinal dimension of the survey-experiment to study the effect of trust in the government on whistleblowing attitude at the within-subjects level. For the Italian sample, we disregard the gender and compare the pooled high-trust data with the pooled low-trust data. For the American sample, we undertake separate analysis for male and female vignettes, since we detected an interaction between the gender of the third person in the vignette and the attitude toward whistleblowing in the second stage of the experiment.
The non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test for related samples suggests a significant treatment effect both in LT-HT and HT-LT treatments. The results are depicted in Table 6 . The non-parametric results are confirmed by parametric analysis. Given the structure of the data, we estimate GLS random-effects models. More specifically, we regress the respondents' agreement to blow the whistle on tax evaders on a Second Stage Vignette dummy, which is equal to 1 if the vignette comes from the second stage and 0 otherwise, and on the set of personal and contextual controls utilized for between-subjects analysis. 
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As shown by the positive and significant coefficient of the Second Stage Vignette in columns 1, 3, and 5, the level of respondents' disagreement when others choose not to report the tax evaders, increases if one moves from a low-trust to a high-trust environment. On the contrary, the evidence in columns 2, 4, and 6 suggests that individuals agree more with hiding tax evaders if one moves from a high-trust to a low-trust environment. These results lead us to the following conclusion.
Result 2. Even at the within-subjects level, trust in the government exerts a positive effect on attitude toward blowing the whistle on tax evaders.
The National Survey in Armenia
The survey covered all the regions of the Republic of Armenia. The goal of the initiative was to assess the public awareness of the tax system in Armenia, to understand citizens'
perceptions of the efficiency of the tax policy and of the services provided by the tax administration, as well as to capture the main reasons of taxpayer dissatisfaction with taxation.
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The sampling frame of the survey was built from the database of electricity users provided by the Electric Networks of Armenia, which is the only electricity provider in the country. Given that roughly 100% of Armenian households use electric power and that the electricity is provided by a single company, this database is amongst the most exhaustive and up-to-date lists of households available for the country. Regarding sampling strategy, multistage cluster sampling with stratification by administrative regions and the settlement type (i.e., the capital, other urban and rural areas) was implemented. Random sampling of clusters within each stratum was conducted and a random sample of households within each cluster was selected.
The margin of error was specified at the 95% confidence interval. Moreover, a reserve sample of equal size was constructed with the same methodology, to cover the non-response rate where necessary. The respondent in each household was chosen among the members of age 18 and 11 It is important to notice that the survey was not explicitly conducted to understand the factors influencing taxpayers' attitude toward whistleblowing.
above by the next birthday method of respondent selection, whereby the household member whose birthday is the closest is selected for an interview. The data were collected via face-toface interviews with the help of standardized questionnaires and show cards, which is a common mode for data collection used in influential surveys (e.g., the World Value Survey, among others). Weights were introduced to ensure the representativeness of the survey. The household and individual weights were calculated with the non-response rate taken into consideration.
The Empirical Specification
We estimate a regression equation of the following form:
.
(
The dependent variable, is individual i's attitude toward whistleblowing, built as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent answered positively to the question:
"Is it proper to inform the tax authorities in case the requirements of the tax legislation are violated (for example, business entities do not provide cash receipts)?". Unlike in the USA, the whistleblowers are neither materially rewarded nor fully protected for exposing tax evaders in the Republic of Armenia.
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As a robustness check we concentrated our attention on the three principal decision-making institutions in the country: the parliament, the president, and the executive government (prime minister and the other ministers). We constructed a combined index by averaging the trust toward the seminal institutions and treating it as our variable of interest. The estimation results remain intact.
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heteroskedasticity of residuals by introducing White robust standard errors. To overcome the problem, we conduct multiple imputation using chained equations (MICE) since missing values occur in the majority of the variables. We used 20 imputations.
An underlying assumption of MICE is that the values in the dataset are missing at random (MAR), which means that the probability that a value is missing depends only on observed values and not on unobserved values (e.g., Azur et al., 2011; Schafer & Graham, 2002 We distinguish between those who actually work and those who do not work. Our definition diverges from the official definition of unemployment, which can create discrepancy with the official statistics. Please also note that there is active debate whether the official unemployment statistics corresponds to the real unemployment in the country.
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In order to provide suggestive evidence on this assumption, we run formal regression analysis and illustrate that the missingness pattern of the variables in the dataset either depends on observed characteristics (e.g., age, education, income, marital status and the like) or does not depend on observed characteristics at all. The results of the regressions are available upon request.
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5.2.Results
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, we estimate (1) by running logistic regressions. For the sake of robustness of our results, we estimate equation (1) either by imputing missing data through MICE or by using the original dataset after dropping the missing values. Table 9 reports the estimates. The results in columns 1 and 2 are obtained with the imputed dataset, whereas the results in column 3 are obtained with the reduced dataset. The estimated odds ratios are reported for the ease of interpreting the results. A value above one indicates that the covariate increases the likelihood of reporting a positive attitude toward whistleblowing, while a value below one decreases the same likelihood. Moreover, the further the value is from one, the stronger the impact of the independent variable. Table 5 apply. Significance Levels: * p<10, ** p<5%, *** p<1%. Table 9 suggests a significant relationship between trust in the government and the attitude toward whistleblowing. More specifically, the odds ratio of Trust Government greater than one indicates that trust increases the likelihood of a positive attitude toward whistleblowing. This result is in line with the findings of the vignette study. We also detect a gender effect, whereby the odds ratio of Male (smaller than one) indicates that being male decreases the likelihood of 28 expressing a positive attitude for whistleblowing. An intuitive justification for the gender effect is that whistleblowers may be associated with sneaks, and a whistleblower (if uncovered) may lose her reputation among her peers. The masculine identity in Armenia (like other patriarchal societies) is closely linked to reputation, status and power and there are a number of activities in which men are unlikely to be engaged, including reporting corruption (e.g., Duban, 2010) .
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In line with the results drawn from the survey-experiment, the perception of tax evasion does not turn out to be significantly related with the attitude toward whistleblowing. The same refers to such socio-demographic variables as age, education, employment status and income.
In sum, the survey evidence from Armenia confirms the positive relationship between trust in authorities and whistleblowing documented in the survey-experiment.
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
We have investigated the relationship between trust in the government and the respondents' attitude toward reporting tax evasion. To establish causality and guarantee external validity, we have presented results from a survey-experiment conducted in Italy and the US and from a nationwide household survey data from the Republic of Armenia. Our results indicate that citizens with high trust in formal authorities are more likely to report taxpayers' fraudulent behavior under different methodological approaches and cultural contexts. Interestingly, we detect some gender effect, whereby females are more prone to whistleblowing than males in Armenia.
Our results contribute to the literature on the institutional determinants of taxpayer behavior.
Indeed, our results complement the empirically validated positive relationship between trust in the government, tax morale and tax compliance (Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl, 2008; Feld & Frey, 2002) , suggesting that trust is likely to strengthen the effectiveness of whistleblowing, which is an innovative and relatively cheap instrument to contrast tax evasion.
From a policy perspective, our findings are of special relevance for third-world countries like Armenia, which suffer from chronic distrust in public institutions, albeit strive to establish 29 effective whistleblowing mechanisms to encourage reporting fraudulent tax behaviors.
Enhancing taxpayer trust in the government and in other formal institutions may represent the first crucial step to encourage whistleblowing on tax evaders, before designing complex legal regimes and incentive schemes. In this regard, it may be of vital importance to make sure that the public is aware of the government spending as well as convinced in its efficacy and appropriateness (at least on average). The policymakers may have a myriad of choices here, starting from involving taxpayers in defining the public spending in cooperation with the government (e.g., Lamberton, 2013) and ending with taxpayer calculators (e.g., HMRC tax calculator) or targeted letters sent to taxpayers about the public goods financed by the taxes (e.g., Castro & Scartascini, 2015; Doerrenberg & Schmitz, 2015) .
The policymakers may also want to consider the influence of personal variables to enhance reporting activities. In patriarchal societies like Armenia, targeted campaigns can be run to emphasize the positive aspects of whistleblowing and to create a positive image of whistleblowers in the eyes of males. Furthermore, in some countries, the campaigns may also be targeted to increasing individuals' intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. The results of the survey-experiment in Italy and the USA provide suggestive evidence of this claim.
